IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

FILED
U.S. District Court
District of Kansas
08/10/2026
Clerk, U.S. District Court
By: SND Deputy Clerk

ADRIANA COROMOTO OLMEDO GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

SAMUEL OLSON, Director, ICE Field Office;
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, DHS Secretary;
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General;
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW; and
Warden, Midwest Regional Reception Center,

Respondents.

Case No. 26-3270-JWL

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, by which she challenges her detention by immigration officials without a bond hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court **grants** the petition. Respondents are ordered either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before **August 24, 2026**, and they are further ordered to provide notice to this Court when such relief has been given.

Petitioner has alleged – and respondents have not disputed – that petitioner was paroled into the United States in 2021; that she was detained by immigration officials on May 29, 2026; and that petitioner remains in custody in this judicial district pending

removal proceedings. On July 29, 2026, petitioner filed the instant habeas action, and the Court ordered an expedited response; respondents have now filed an answer, and the matter is therefore ripe for ruling.

To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that she is "in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory and constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of removal. *See Demore v. Kim*, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Respondents have not argued that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim.

Petitioner was not recently detained as an alien newly arriving in the United States; rather, she had been present in the United States for a period of years when she was detained. Petitioner argues that, for that reason, her detention does not fall within the scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention pending removal proceedings, and under which the Government purports to detain petitioner; but instead is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary release on bond. Petitioner thus claims that her detention without any consideration of her release on bond violates these statutes.[1]

In cases involving the same issue, this Court has rejected the Government's interpretation of these statutes in favor of the interpretation adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue, and the Court has ordered relief in the

[1] Petitioner also claims that her detention without consideration of release on bond violates due process. In light of the Court's conclusion that petitioner is entitled to bond consideration under the statutes, it need not reach that issue.

form of a bond hearing under Section 1226(a). *See, e.g.*, *Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh*, 2026 WL 710121 (D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.). The Court has also held that that reasoning applies in the case of aliens, such as petitioner here, who have pursued an application for asylum or been paroled into the United States. *See Khudyi v. Carter*, 2026 WL 1098197, at *2 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.). The Tenth Circuit has now rejected the Government's interpretation as well. *See Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin*, __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 1876709 (10th Cir. June 30, 2026). Respondents concede that the relevant facts of the present case are not materially distinguishable from those in the cited cases, and they therefore acknowledge that the reasoning of those cases would also apply here. Thus, pursuant to *Santillan Quiroz*, and for the same reasons set forth in that case and in the Court's opinion in *Galdamez Orellana*, the Court concludes in this case that the Government may not detain petitioner under Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and that it may therefore detain petitioner pending a final removal decision only under Section 1226(a), which allows for release on bond; and that the Government has therefore violated these statutes by refusing to allow for consideration of petitioner's release on bond under Section 1226(a).

With respect to the remedy for this violation, petitioner essentially seeks the same relief granted in *Galdamez Orellana* and *Santillan Quiroz*. For the same reasons stated in those cases, *see Santillan Quiroz*, 2026 WL 1876709, at *17 n.13; *Galdamez Orellana*, 2026 WL 710121, at *3-4, the Court concludes that the most appropriate remedy for this violation is to require that petitioner be granted a bond hearing as if detained under Section 1226(a). Accordingly, the Court orders respondents either to release petitioner or to ensure

that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at which petitioner's suitability for release on bond is considered on its merits, on or before **August 24, 2026**.[2]

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby **granted**. Respondents are ordered either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before **August 24, 2026**, and they are further ordered to provide notice to this Court when such relief has been given.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 10th day of August, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.

/s/ John W. Lungstrum
Hon. John W. Lungstrum
United States District Judge

[2] Petitioner has requested that a bond hearing be conducted within 14 days, and the Court has therefore imposed that deadline. Respondents have not argued or provided evidence that a hearing could not be conducted within that timeframe. Nor have respondents argued that an immigration judge could not conduct a bond hearing for petitioner on the merits. Although this Court lacks jurisdiction to review an immigration judge's denial of release on bond, *see Chen v. Dorneker*, 2021 WL 5769354, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 6, 2021) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)), it would not be precluded from reviewing an immigration judge's refusal to conduct a hearing based the *Yajure Hurtado* decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals.