

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS**

**WILLIAM CHRISTOPHER CHEATHAM,**

**Plaintiff,**

**v.**

**CASE NO. 21-3139-SAC**

**SCOTT SCHWAB, et al.,**

**Defendants.**

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**  
**TO SHOW CAUSE**

Plaintiff William C. Cheatham is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein.

**I. Nature of the Matter before the Court**

Plaintiff filed this *pro se* civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Plaintiff alleges that he was held by the Kansas Department of Corrections (KDOC) approximately four months beyond his sentence in Leavenworth County District Court Case No. 2013CR974.

Plaintiff names as defendants: Scott Schwab, Kansas Secretary of State; Michelle Sullivan, Manager, Sentence Computation Unit at KDOC; and Jeff Zmuda, Kansas Secretary of Corrections.

Plaintiff's request for relief seeks \$2 million in damages.

**II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints**

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are

legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); *Northington v. Jackson*, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. *Anderson v. Blake*, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” *Hall v. Bellmon*, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires ‘more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Id.* at 555, 570.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the *pro se* plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff

believes the defendant violated.” *Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents*, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” *Whitney v. New Mexico*, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Twombly* and *Erickson* gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. *See Kay v. Bemis*, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); *see also Smith v. United States*, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” *Kay*, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” *Smith*, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” *Robbins v. Oklahoma*, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing *Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).

### **III. DISCUSSION**

#### **A. Statute of Limitations**

The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 actions is determined from looking at the appropriate state statute of limitations and tolling principles. *See Hardin v. Straub*, 490 U.S. 536, 539 (1989). “The forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions governs civil rights claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983. . . . In Kansas, that is the two-year statute of limitations in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–513(a).” *Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist. 501, Topeka Pub. Sch.*,

465 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). The same two-year statute of limitations governs actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. *See Alexander v. Oklahoma*, 382 F.3d 1206, 1212 (10th Cir.), *rehearing denied*, 391 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2004), *cert. denied*, 544 U.S. 1044 (2005).

While state law governs the length of the limitations period and tolling issues, “the accrual date of a § 1983 cause of action is a question of federal law.” *Wallace v. Kato*, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). Under federal law, the claim accrues “when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In other words, “[a] § 1983 action accrues when facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” *Fogle v. Pierson*, 435 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), *cert. denied* 549 U.S. 1059 (2006). A district court may dismiss a complaint filed by an indigent plaintiff if it is patently clear from the allegations as tendered that the action is barred by the statute of limitations. *Id.* at 1258–59; *see also Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199, 214 (2007); *Hawkins v. Lemons*, No. 09-3116-SAC, 2009 WL 2475130, at \*2 (D. Kan. Aug. 12, 2009).

Plaintiff states that on January 10, 2018, his probation in Case No. 2013CR974 was revoked and he was committed to the custody of the KDOC for 14 months with 20 days of jail credit and 20% good time credit. He asserts his release date should have been February 8, 2019, but he was actually released in June of 2019. (ECF No. 1, at 2, 3.)

Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal as barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff filed his Complaint on June 4, 2021. It appears that Plaintiff’s § 1983 action would have accrued as soon as he was not released on Plaintiff’s asserted correct release date of February 8, 2019, more than two years prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s Complaint, thus making his claim time-barred. *See Fratus v. Deland*, 49 F.3d 673, 674-75 (10th Cir. 1995) (district court may consider affirmative defenses *sua sponte* when the defense is obvious from the face of the

complaint and no further factual record is required to be developed). Plaintiff has not alleged facts suggesting that he would be entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. Plaintiff is directed to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.

## **B. Personal Participation**

An essential element of a civil rights claim against an individual is that person's direct personal participation in the acts or inactions upon which the complaint is based. *Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); *Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dept.*, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir.2007); *Trujillo v. Williams*, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2006); *Foote v. Spiegel*, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423–24 (10th Cir. 1997). Conclusory allegations of involvement are not sufficient. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."). "To establish a violation of § 1983 ... the plaintiff must establish a deliberate, intentional act on the part of the defendant to violate the plaintiff's legal rights." *Porro v. Barnes*, 624 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (10th Cir.2010).

The Complaint fails to allege any facts showing that either Scott Schwab or Jeff Zmuda personally participated in the claimed violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. It is not enough for Plaintiff to allege that the defendants had general oversight of the computation of prisoner sentences. *Meade v. Grubbs*, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding that to be held liable under § 1983, a supervisor must have personally participated in the complained-of constitutional deprivation). Plaintiff makes no allegation that Defendant Schwab or Zmuda participated in the computation of Plaintiff's sentence, the determination of his release date, or any decision resulting

in his alleged over-detention. As a result, Defendants Schwab and Zmuda are subject to dismissal from this lawsuit.

#### **IV. Response Required**

For the reasons stated herein, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to dismissal in its entirety. Plaintiff is therefore required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff is warned that his failure to file a timely response may result in the Complaint being dismissed without further notice.

#### **V. Pending Motion**

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to Add Exhibit Pages and 3-Page Statement (ECF No. 2) at the same time he filed his Complaint. He attached the exhibits and statement to his motion. The Court grants the motion and has considered the attachments.

**IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT** that Plaintiff is granted until **November 5, 2021**, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Add Exhibit Pages and 3-Page Statement (ECF No. 2) is **granted**.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

**Dated October 5, 2021, in Topeka, Kansas.**

s/ Sam A. Crow  
**Sam A. Crow**  
**U.S. Senior District Judge**