

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS**

VIRGIL BRADFORD,

Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO. 18-3163-SAC

DAN SCHNURR, et al.,

Defendants.

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE**

Plaintiff Virgil Bradford is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this case should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a proper amended complaint to cure the deficiencies discussed herein.

I. Nature of the Matter before the Court

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action alleging a denial of proper medical care. Plaintiff alleges that on March 28, 2017, he was in the Central Unit Gym playing ping-pong when he slipped in a puddle of water and fell into another inmate causing that inmate to fall on top of Plaintiff. Plaintiff tried to continue his game, but sharp and throbbing pain started shooting through his left shoulder. Plaintiff went to the Officer's desk and asked Officer Foster to call the clinic. Officer Foster refused, stating that he would not call the clinic because Plaintiff "was not going to sue" and that Plaintiff knew the water was on the floor and fell on purpose. Foster stated that if any other officer or the Gym Coordinator Cassey wanted to call for Plaintiff they could. Plaintiff claims that "none made any attempt to assist the Plaintiff seeing he was asking

for help and in pain.” (Doc. 1, at 6.) Plaintiff then attempted to have his cellhouse sergeant call medical for him and the sergeant told him that he needed to fill out a sick call form. The sergeant then told Plaintiff to go “lockdown.”

That night when Plaintiff came out for work at 11:00 p.m., Plaintiff asked the night sergeant if he would call the clinic for him and he did. However, the sergeant told Plaintiff he could not lay in for the night from work, telling him that if he did not work he would get a “write up” for work performance. That night, Plaintiff filled out a sick call and was called out the next morning to the clinic where he was given ibuprofen and told that nothing was wrong. By March 3, 2017,¹ Plaintiff was in so much pain that he had to go back to the clinic. “Some time further down the road” the clinic finally took x-rays of Plaintiff’s shoulder and Plaintiff was told that he had some swollen tissue and arthritis in his left shoulder. The next time Plaintiff went to the clinic he was in so much pain that they sent Plaintiff to physical therapy. After going through therapy “so long” the therapist stated that he could not do anything more for Plaintiff and he told the clinic that Plaintiff needed an MRI.

The clinic finally sent Plaintiff to have an MRI, which reflected a small tear in Plaintiff’s left shoulder that was 1.3 centimeters in length. Several weeks later Plaintiff was able to see an outside specialist who stated that Plaintiff had a large tear in his left tendon which needed surgery as soon as possible. A week or two later, on December 27, 2017, Plaintiff received surgery.

II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

¹ Plaintiff alleges that he was initially injured on March 28, 2017, and it is unclear if the March 3 date is a typographical error.

§ 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

“To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); *Northington v. Jackson*, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. *Anderson v. Blake*, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” *Hall v. Bellmon*, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Id.* at 555, 570.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the *pro se* plaintiff]; when the defendant

did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." *Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents*, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." *Whitney v. New Mexico*, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in *Twombly* and *Erickson* gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. *See Kay v. Bemis*, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); *see also Smith v. United States*, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts "look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief." *Kay*, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, "a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" *Smith*, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). "Plausible" in this context does not mean "likely to be true," but rather refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." *Robbins v. Oklahoma*, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing *Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff claims that he has been denied proper medical care. The Eighth Amendment guarantees a prisoner the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (citation omitted).

The “deliberate indifference” standard includes both an objective and a subjective component. *Martinez v. Garden*, 430 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). In the objective analysis, the deprivation must be “sufficiently serious,” and the inmate must show the presence of a “serious medical need,” that is “a serious illness or injury.” *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 104, 105; *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), *Martinez*, 430 F.3d at 1304 (citation omitted). A serious medical need includes “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” *Martinez*, 430 F.3d at 1304 (quoting *Sealock v. Colorado*, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).

“The subjective component is met if a prison official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” *Id.* (quoting *Sealock*, 218 F.3d at 1209). In measuring a prison official’s state of mind, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” *Id.* at 1305 (quoting *Riddle v. Mondragon*, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996)).

A mere difference of opinion between the inmate and prison medical personnel regarding diagnosis or reasonable treatment does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. *See Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 106–07; *see also Coppinger v. Townsend*, 398 F.2d 392, 394 (10th Cir. 1968) (prisoner’s right is to medical care—not to type or scope of medical care he desires and difference of opinion between a physician and a patient does not give rise to a constitutional right or sustain a claim under § 1983). Plaintiff’s allegations do not show a complete lack of medical care, but rather show Plaintiff’s disagreement regarding the proper course of treatment. *See Gee v. Pacheco*, 627 F.3d 1178, 1192 (10th Cir. 2010) (noting that plaintiff’s allegations indicate not

a lack of medical treatment, but a disagreement with the doctor's medical judgment in treating a condition with a certain medication rather than others).

Delay in providing medical care does not violate the Eighth Amendment, unless there has been deliberate indifference resulting in substantial harm. *Olson v. Stotts*, 9 F.3d 1475 (10th Cir. 1993). In situations where treatment was delayed rather than denied altogether, the Tenth Circuit requires a showing that the inmate suffered "substantial harm" as a result of the delay. *Sealock v. Colorado*, 218 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). "The substantial harm requirement 'may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.'" *Mata v. Saiz*, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Garrett v. Stratman*, 254 F.3d 946, 950 (10th Cir. 2001)).

Plaintiff's allegations of denial of medical care are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff's allegations indicate that he has been furnished medical care during the relevant time frame. They also indicate that his claims amount to a difference of opinion with the treatments he has been provided by medical staff. Plaintiff's allegations are nothing more than a lay person's disagreement with the medical treatment of his symptoms by medical professionals. Plaintiff's allegations of denial of medical care are subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim. Such allegations do not rise to the level of a claim of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment; and are, at most, grounds for a negligence or malpractice claim in state court.

IV. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required

Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper

amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein.² Plaintiff is given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) shows he has exhausted administrative remedies for all claims alleged; (2) raises only properly joined claims and defendants; (3) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional violation and show a cause of action in federal court; and (4) alleges sufficient facts to show personal participation by each named defendant.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter will be decided based upon the current deficient Complaint.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted until **March 11, 2019**, in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until **March 11, 2019**, in which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed herein.

The clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff.

² In order to add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to the original complaint, and instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must write the number of this case (18-3163-SAC) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by each defendant including dates, locations, and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated in Topeka, Kansas, on this 13th day of February, 2019.

s/ Sam A. Crow
Sam A. Crow
U.S. Senior District Judge