## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

**CHARLEY HUGHES,** 

Plaintiff,

v.

**CASE NO. 18-3101-SAC** 

MARTHA CODER, et al.,

Defendants.

# MEMORANDUM AND ORDER AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Charley Hughes is hereby required to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District Judge, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff's Complaint that are discussed herein. Plaintiff is also given an opportunity to file a proper amended complaint to cure the deficiencies.

#### I. Nature of the Matter before the Court

Plaintiff brings this *pro se* civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (Doc. 5.) Plaintiff is incarcerated at the Hutchinson Correctional Facility in Hutchinson, Kansas ("HCF"). Plaintiff alleges that he was scheduled to be released from prison on September 15, 2017. On August 15, 2017, he received paperwork to serve a consecutive sentence of 130 months. Plaintiff alleges that he has already served 47 months for the same charge and that the Defendants conspired to keep Plaintiff falsely imprisoned and denied his request for release. Plaintiff's conspiracy claim alleges that "Defendants Martha Coder, Joe Norwood and Dan Schnurr acted in concert to commit an

unlawful act that inflicted a wrong against Plaintiff. The conspiracy was impelled by a commingle of racial and political motives." (Doc. 1, at 3.) Plaintiff also claims that Defendants Norwood and Schnurr discriminated against Plaintiff on August 17, 2017, when they denied Plaintiff's release due to his affiliation with the New Afrikan Black Panther prison chapter. Lastly, Plaintiff claims that "all defendants subjected Plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude." *Id.* at 4. Plaintiff names as Defendants: Martha Coder; Joe Norwood; Dan Schnurr; Mike Nickels; and Brian Drinkwalter. Plaintiff seeks \$100,000 in punitive damages, \$50,000 in compensatory damages, and "immediate release from prison." *Id.* at 5.

## **II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints**

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–(2).

"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not

raise a claim of entitlement to relief," dismissal is appropriate. *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).

A pro se litigant's "conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." *Hall v. Bellmon*, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitlement to relief' requires "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's "factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Id.* at 555, 570.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained "that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the *pro se* plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated." *Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents*, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." *Whitney v. New Mexico*, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).

The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in *Twombly* and *Erickson* gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. *See Kay v. Bemis*, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); *see also Smith v. United States*, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts "look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief." *Kay*, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, "a plaintiff must 'nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." *Smith*, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). "Plausible" in

this context does not mean "likely to be true," but rather refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent," then the plaintiff has not "nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." *Robbins v. Oklahoma*, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing *Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).

#### III. Discussion

### A. Habeas Nature of Claim

Plaintiff seeks "immediate release from prison." A petition for habeas corpus relief is a state prisoner's sole remedy in federal court for a claim of entitlement to immediate or speedier release. *Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973); *McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n*, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997); *see Boutwell v. Keating*, 399 F.3d 1203, 1209 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[H]abeas corpus is the only avenue for a challenge to the *fact* or *duration* of confinement, at least when the remedy requested would result in the prisoner's immediate or speedier release from that confinement.") (emphasis in original). When the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement. *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994); *see also Montez v. McKinna*, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief). Because Plaintiff is challenging the legality of his current confinement, his claims are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.

Liberally construing Plaintiff's complaint as a habeas corpus action would not save it because there is no indication that Plaintiff has exhausted his state court remedies. Plaintiff must

give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims by properly presenting them to the highest state court, either by direct appeal or through a state habeas action, before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition. *See Brown v. Shanks*, 185 F.3d 1122, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999); *O'Sullivan v. Boerckel*, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999).

If Plaintiff has been convicted and a judgment on Plaintiff's claim in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction, the claim may be barred by *Heck*. In *Heck v*. *Humphrey*, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider the following:

whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

*Heck*, 512 U.S. at 487. In *Heck*, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implicates the validity of the plaintiff's conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by executive order. *Id.* at 486–87.

#### B. Conspiracy

Plaintiff's bare conspiracy allegations fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. To state a claim for conspiracy, Plaintiff must include in his complaint enough factual allegations to suggest that an agreement was made. *Gee v. Pacheco*, 627 F.3d 1178, 1183 (10th Cir. 2010). A bare assertion of conspiracy, absent context implying a meeting of the minds, fails to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. *Id.* Here, Plaintiff provides no factual information whatsoever to demonstrate any type of agreement was made between anyone. Such a conclusory allegation fails to state a plausible claim for relief and is subject to dismissal.

### C. Personal Participation

An essential element of a civil rights claim against an individual is that person's direct personal participation in the acts or inactions upon which the complaint is based. *Kentucky v. Graham*, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); *Trujillo v. Williams*, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006); *Foote v. Spiegel*, 118 F.3d 1416, 1423–24 (10th Cir. 1997). Conclusory allegations of involvement are not sufficient. *See Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009). As a result, a plaintiff is required to name each defendant not only in the caption of the complaint, but again in the body of the complaint and to include in the body a description of the acts taken by each defendant that violated plaintiff's federal constitutional rights.

Plaintiff fails to allege personal participation by Defendants Nickels and Drinkwalter in any purported constitutional violations. Plaintiff has not identified particular acts or omissions by each defendant. Plaintiff must explain what each defendant did to him, when the defendant did it, how the defendant's actions harmed him, and what specific legal right he believes the defendant violated. *Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents*, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). Because he has failed to do this, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 1983 against these defendants.

## D. Damages

Plaintiff's request for compensatory damages is barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), because Plaintiff has failed to allege a physical injury. Section 1997e(e) provides in pertinent part that "[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

Plaintiffs also seeks punitive damages, which are available in a § 1983 lawsuit. However, they "are available only for conduct which is 'shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." *Searles v. Van Bebber*, 251 F.3d 869, 879 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting *Smith v. Wade*, 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)). Plaintiff presents no plausible basis for a claim of punitive damages because he alleges no facts whatsoever establishing that any defendant acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Plaintiff's request for punitive damages is subject to dismissal.

#### E. Discrimination

Plaintiff makes a bald allegation that he was discriminated against for his affiliation in the New Afrikan Black Panther prison chapter. Plaintiff alleges no facts to support a claim of discrimination. Furthermore, this Court has previously denied Plaintiff's claims alleging that certain defendants conspired to deem the NABPP ("New Afrikan Black Panther Party") a security threat group ("STG"). *See Hughes v. Robinson*, Case No. 18-3025 (D. Kan.). The Court dismissed that case for failure to state a claim. *Id*.

#### F. Constitutional Violation

Plaintiff's bare allegation that "all defendants subjected Plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude" fails to state a claim for relief. Plaintiff alleges no facts in support of this allegation.

## IV. Response and/or Amended Complaint Required

Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff is also given the opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint upon court-approved forms that cures all the deficiencies discussed herein.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> To add claims, significant factual allegations, or change defendants, a plaintiff must submit a complete amended complaint. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. An amended complaint is not simply an addendum to the original complaint, and

Plaintiff is given time to file a complete and proper amended complaint in which he (1) shows he

has exhausted administrative remedies for all claims alleged; (2) raises only properly joined

claims and defendants; (3) alleges sufficient facts to state a claim for a federal constitutional

violation and show a cause of action in federal court; and (4) alleges sufficient facts to show

personal participation by each named defendant.

If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint within the prescribed time that cures all

the deficiencies discussed herein, this matter will be decided based upon the current deficient

Complaint.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT Plaintiff is granted until September 14, 2018,

in which to show good cause, in writing, to the Honorable Sam A. Crow, United States District

Judge, why Plaintiff's Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is also granted until September 14, 2018, in

which to file a complete and proper amended complaint to cure all the deficiencies discussed

herein.

The clerk is directed to send § 1983 forms and instructions to Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated in Topeka, Kansas, on this 15th day of August, 2018.

s/ Sam A. Crow Sam A. Crow

**U.S. Senior District Judge** 

instead completely supersedes it. Therefore, any claims or allegations not included in the amended complaint are no longer before the court. It follows that a plaintiff may not simply refer to an earlier pleading, and the amended complaint must contain all allegations and claims that a plaintiff intends to pursue in the action, including those to be retained from the original complaint. Plaintiff must write the number of this case (18-3101-SAC) at the top of the first page of his amended complaint and he must name every defendant in the caption of the amended complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Plaintiff should also refer to each defendant again in the body of the amended complaint, where he must allege facts describing the unconstitutional acts taken by each defendant including dates, locations,

and circumstances. Plaintiff must allege sufficient additional facts to show a federal constitutional violation.

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